AFGHANISTAN SEED AND CROP IMPROVEMENT SITUATION

XII. STRATEGY AND APPROACHES FOR IMPROVEMENT

XII.7. IMMEDIATE STRATEGY FOR SEED STORAGE AND TRANSPORT

Seed storage is reportedly "not a problem, because of the dry climate and cold winters, and because most storage is for relatively short periods". Seed is reported to be safely stored for current requirements by using existing masonry buildings or even sheds.

XII.7.1. STORAGE AND STORAGE CAPACITY

Storage conditions expected are for wheat, for short periods, under Afghanistan's very dry and reasonably cool climate, but with high temperatures at the storage time.

Only a clean, dry, shaded storage, protected from direct sunlight and any rain, is needed. The seed must also be protected from birds and rats, and should not be stacked directly on the floor or against walls. Different varieties and lots should be stacked separately.

Generally, raw (uncleaned) seed and clean seed are kept in different storages. Under present conditions here, this is not essential. General practices in multi-lot/variety storages indicates that about 45% of the cubic storage space is actually filled with seed. With larger quantities of each variety stacked together here, a much higher percentage of the cubic storage space will be used. Considering the need to move seed into/out of storage for cleaning, etc., it is estimated that about 175% of the total cubic volume of the wheat seed would be adequate for working space and space lost due to separate lots.

XII.7.2. TRANSPORT

Poor condition of roads and transport systems have created problems of moving seed. For time and cost efficiency, it appears to be more effective to produce seed (wheat, barley, maize, etc.) in local areas or Districts where the seed will be used.

However, it must be noted that the Future Harvest Consortium was able, on short notice, to hire trucks and transport large quantities of seed to a number of areas where it was distributed. The Future Harvest manager in Kabul feels that hiring truck transport is not a serious consideration except for availability of funds.

One NGO (ACTED) reports that it has its own fleet of trucks.

XII.7.3. PLACEMENT OF SEED PRODUCTION PROGRAMS

With the poor condition of roads and communication facilities, it is even more important that a form of the "Advanced Village Seed Production Unit", an improved version of the informal seed supply system, be initiated on a wide scale.

Village Seed Production Units could supply a small area (1 or a few villages) within a short distance. This could help overcome some of the more serious problems, such as:

Eliminating doubts as to what the market will be, and being able to produce to meet the market needs.
Eliminating extensive needs for communications among retail outlets/dealers.
Eliminating the need for facilities for seed transport and storage.
Minimizing promotion and advertising costs, and reaching the customers directly.
Using seed production fields for promotional demonstrations.

XII.8. STRATEGY ON THE FUNCTIONS OF ISE

XII.8.1. TECHNICAL/POTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF ISE

A realistic analysis of the future potential of ISE reveals the following:

ISE was established in 1976, when it was still "fashionable" for governments to establish parastatal organizations to produce and supply seed. ISE, as others were, was production-oriented; not market-oriented; had no structure to develop farmer use of seed produced; was governed by government bureaucrats (who are notoriously focused on government targets rather than real market potential).
The era of conflict started in 1977, so that ISE never had a chance to display its capabilities or potentials, or lack thereof.
ISE has stagnated in growth, concepts, market orientation, and other essential areas during the period of conflict.
During the conflict, some ISE facilities have been looted. Personnel have received little training (other than some technical training aimed at making it a better subsidiary of the FAO emergency intervention seed program). It is in poor condition, and has not kept pace with developments in seed supply, business management, market development, etc.
In the meantime, the world has gained considerable experience in (the problems of) seed production and supply. The concept of ISE conflicts with the lessons learned, and needs to be re-oriented.
The re-establishment of ISE as a government parastatal would send a strong signal to the domestic and international private sector that the government of Afghanistan, regardless of what it said, was not really focusing on development of a private sector. The result (of rehabilitating ISE) would constrain the development of an effective, market-oriented seed supply system.

XII.8.2. STRATEGY ON FUTURE OF ISE

If Afghanistan is to become an active member of today's world, it does not have a place for a rundown, outdated approach to seed production and supply. It must move forward, and not spend a couple of decades repeating the lessons learned by other countries.

The following recommendations are offered to help Afghanistan leap over the lost decades, and begin at a point of advantage.

Establish an improved, Afghanistan-specific informal seed industry as described elsewhere herein.
Establish a policy and legal basis for encouraging private sector investment in seed production and supply.
Disband or dispose of ISE, in order to send a clear signal to potential investors that Afghanistan is creating conditions favorable for investment. As to ISE, it is recommended that each unit (as a separate small program, definitely not as a large organization with several sites and high overhead costs) be offered to its employees at no cost, with the proviso that they prepare a market plan and a business plan, which must be accepted by a committee of international specialists, to establish a small-scale private enterprise (not connected to government) to market seed in a local area. There should be the proviso that the land and permanent facilities will not be sold within a 10-year period. To encourage this further, upon acceptance of the employee group's business plan, government should offer them an interest-free 10-year-period loan of US$100,000 to provide working capital.