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Arabic Version:
English Version:
NEWS and VIEWS
News,
views, comments and suggestions on varieties and seeds are included in this
section. It is also a forum for discussion among professionals in the seed
sector.
Trends in Seed Legislation in Developing Countries: Deregulation
Regulatory reforms
The first seed laws that were enacted in most developing countries were based
on the blueprint model supplied by the Seed Industry Development Program of
the FAO. The details depend to a large extent on the origin of the advisors
assisting the development of the seed sector. India adopted a truth-in-labeling
system of the USA, but combined this with a very strict variety control system
from Europe. The seed laws of many other countries simply took either the
examples of France, Spain or UK as a basis, depending on their historical
ties and official languages. While taking these European laws as a basis,
they often picked the most stringent control mechanisms from these countries.
For example the variety release system is based on government-run multi-location
DUS and VCU tests whereas the marketing of certified seed of all crops is
covered under comprehensive seed certification schemes. The level of regulation
is commonly not in line with the level of institutional development of the
country, leading to incomplete implementation and insufficient transparency.
This creates a serious lack of credibility and inconsistent application of
these regulations by the authorities.
Two rather opposite forces, globalization and localization, in development
theory have inspired reforms to the standard regulatory systems. And both
forces lead to calls for deregulation. Forces that relate to globalization
and liberalization of markets oppose the existing regulations because the
level of government control would hinder foreign investments in the seed sector
and the emergence of domestic private seed enterprises. Moreover, similar
to the influence of past development assistance projects which advocated the
establishment of public seed enterprises and their regulatory basis, recent
projects put the needs of farmers' seed production, participatory plant breeding
and establishment of small enterprise as the political and development agenda.
This draws national and international NGO's into the policy debate and present
a different role for seed quality assurance institutions. The belief that
farmers' seed systems are important for on-farm management of genetic resources
puts pressure to relax variety release procedures.
Liberalization of trade requires the removal of obstacles by inefficient control
agencies. The lifting of government controls may also assist the development
of small seed enterprises especially where the inefficiencies of such institutions
are translated into the certification and testing fees, and where market opportunities
for local (non-released and possibly less uniform) varieties cannot be developed
due to such restrictive seed laws.
The multinational seed companies that want to introduce varieties from their
international breeding programs and local seed enterprises and farmer-groups
that may want to provide seed of locally adapted varieties (landraces) would
benefit from lesser variety controls. Large seed companies may work with a
(ISO) certification of their own internal quality control system. Small-scale
seed providers would also better thrive on brand names than on government
certification, especially where the regulatory institutions lack the capacity
to check quite often remote seed production fields.
The options to reform these regulatory and institutional systems depend to
a large extent on the existing institutions and organizations, on bureaucratic
considerations, on regulatory cultures and international pressures. Deregulation
has to strike a balance between the opportunities (promotion of private enterprise)
and reduced consumer protection due to relaxed controls. Proposals to deregulate
and change compulsory regulations into voluntary ones have to go hand in hand
with educating the seed users where many farmers are unable to read seed labels.
A truth-in-labelling system can very well be combined with prescribing certain
minimum standards in order to reduce risks to farmers.
Developments that oppose deregulation trends
Deregulation is a global trend in many sectors. The Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures/Technical Barriers to Trade (SPS/TBT) agreement of WTO prescribes
a framework for acceptable regulations for non-tariff trade barriers, which
do not include extensive seed controls other than strictly necessary phytosanitary
measures. There are, however, tendencies that go in opposite directions. These
include particularly intellectual property rights, biosafety and access regulations
on genetic resources.
First, the WTO-TRIPs agreement urges the development of plant variety protection
laws in many developing countries. In contrast to conventional seed legislation
that intend to abandon variety registration, the introduction of variety protection
laws does require a detailed registration of the protected entity. Moreover,
national and international seed trade will be influenced by protection claims,
not so much because of government laws, but as the result of private law contracts
and private market control organizations (e.g. ARPOV in Argentina) that regulate
the seed trade. Claiming intellectual property rights is a voluntary choice
of breeders, but there is a trend that even public agencies are registering
their varieties, either for profit or as a means to prevent others from claiming
ownership. This new variety registration system will largely replace the 'old'
variety release procedures and will curtail the use of 'protected' varieties
in farmers' seed systems. This is exacerbated by the development of patent-protected
transgenic crops.
Second, the introduction of transgenic crops forced countries to develop biosafety
regulations that make the release of these varieties both for testing and
for commercial use, dependent on extensive release procedures. In case the
use of such varieties becomes more widespread, the reduction in variety registration
procedures due to deregulation in conventional seed laws will be replaced
by comprehensive release procedures under the biosafety laws.
Third, new developments within the framework of CBD may lead to even more
variety regulatory systems than ever experienced under conventional seed laws.
Access to genetic resources is made subject to national laws, based on Prior
Informed Consent (PIC) and Mutually Agreed Terms that may have to be transferred
from first user down the line, and which may lead to extensive variety regulations.
Conclusion
Deregulation in the seed sector is necessary to provide opportunities for
both private enterprises and grassroot initiatives. It should, however, not
lead to abandoning the protection of farmers who cannot judge the quality
of the seed simply by its appearance. International policies towards deregulation
are not as straightforward as they seem to be. The move towards free markets
goes hand in hand with international forces to introduce new and in some cases
even more stringent regulatory frameworks in the seed sector. This creates
a dilemma for national policy makers when they have to combine national policies
and international agreements in developing new regulatory and institutional
arrangements to guide the seed sector. N.P. Louwaars, Center for Genetic Resources,
Wageningen, The Netherlands; E-mail: niels.louwaars@wur.nl
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